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Progress in the technical means of monitoring to verify compliance
to arms control treaties is discussed in the following areas: Real-time
surveillance with charge-coupled devices in the visible and infrared;
image enhancement with digital 1 image processing and with adaptive optics;
imaging with radars based on satellites and on the ground; seismic moni-
toring with high frequency discrimination and with unattended in-country
seismic stations; and nuclear weapons test monitoring with the global
positioning satellite system.
I. INTRODUCTION
Military technologies for fighting wars have made remarkable pro-
gress in the last decade. For example, the accuracy of missiles has im-
proved considerably as cruise missiles use terrain mapping techniques,
submarine launched ballistic missiles use guidance from stellar locations,
and other missiles will use the accurate locations and velocities from
the NAVSTAR global positioning satellites. Along with this progress,
there has also been considerable progress in the technologies (1) which
allow the monitoring of the military activities and systems of &dquo;the other
side.&dquo; These new technologies are not only extremely interesting in a
scientific sense, but they are also encouraging in that they have strength-
ened the ability to verify compliance with the provisions of arms control
treaties. These improvements have been both in quality, with better reso-
lution and data management, and in scope, with new methods of measuring.
In the past, when there have been disagreements over compliance with
existing treaties, confidential discussions have been held between the
Americans and the Soviets in the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC).
Recently both sides have complained publicly about the compliance of the
other side with various treaties. It appears that future progress on
arms control treaties will depend on the resolution of some of these
issues. For this reason, we feel that it is timely to discuss the pro-
gress on some of the technical means of verification. Part of this paper
is derived from a conference (and book) (2) on Technical Means of Veri-
fication of Compliance with Arms Control Treaties which was held at the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology in February of 1984.
The technical means of monitoring foreign military endeavors are
extremely important for arms control for three fundamental reasons:
1. If Soviet or American military planners are convinced that there
is a reasonable chance that they would be discovered in a violation of a
treaty, one would expect that they would tend to be deterred from cheat-
ing since they would not wish to encourage an opponent to increase its
armaments and respond drastically in other arenas.
2. Reconnaissance satellites and other technical means of monitor-
ing are stabilizing since their data may contradict &dquo;worst-case&dquo; analy-
sis. President Johnson commented on this aspect in 1967 when he indi-
cated that the $35-40 billion for space had been well spent, because &dquo;I
Fznaw how many ml1ilZe1 the enemy has.&dquo; &dquo;
3. In order for an arms control treaty to be successfully negoti-
ated by the Executive Branch and ratified by the U.S. Senate, these
bodies must be convinced that the technical and nontechnical means of
verification are &dquo;adequate.&dquo; They must be convinced that the U.S. would
have enough &dquo;timely warning&dquo; so that its national security would not be
threatened significantly by a &dquo;break-out&dquo; by the Soviets from arms control
treaties. And this debate must be carried out in public, so that there
must be some public understanding of verification problems and possibil-
ities.
II. VERIFICATION IN CONTEXT
A clear majority of Americans want arms control, but they also mis-
trust the Soviets. For example, the freeze resolutions that require a
ban on the production, testing, and deployment of nuclear weapons and
their delivery systems, also require that these bans be &dquo;mutually veri-
fiable.&dquo; II Arms control agreements must rely on more than trust to know
that the other side does not violate the terms of the treaties. The
technical means are often synergistic in that, when the various means
are used together, they are most effective in determing what the other
side is doing. The technical means are often directed where to look for
violations by information gathered by human intelligence (HUMINT) and by
intercepted phone calls, or signal intelligence (SIGNIT). These more
clandestine processes have come a long way since Secretary of State Stim-
son cut funding for the Black Chamber cryptographic unit in 1929 with
the comment that &dquo;gev~t.Cemen do not nead each o.theJr.’.6 maÁ1..&dquo; &dquo; It is well 1
known that some phone calls within the United States have been inter-
cepted by the Soviets for at least a decade by using microwave intercept
techniques and other methods. Computer codes search the phone messages
for &dquo;key&dquo; words such as nuclear, MIRV, CEP, and so forth. It is gener-
ally assumed that the techniques used by the U.S. in the Soviet Union
are more sophisticated than those used by the Soviets; this advantage is
offset by the fact that the Soviets have much more access to information
in the &dquo;open&dquo; society of the U.S. Both sides maintain radio antennae on
satellites, airplanes, ships, and on land in order to ferret out usefulinformation from radio messages. These intercepts obtained by technical
means are supplemented by defectors and agents who &dquo;listen&dquo; for signs of
political intention, troop movements, technical information,and so forth.
Ex-President Nexon gave a glimpse into the process when he stated in 1984
that &dquo;One a ~ the Jr.eMOn.6 that the tep-eose a ~ the Pentagon papeu caused
gneat cancenn in the CIA, was that one o6 the liem.6 in the papeks could
only have come bnam the [act that we had 13Jr.ezhnev’,6 caA bugged.&dquo; (3) In
certain cases it is possible to assist the technical means of verification
with &dquo;cooperative measures&dquo; in which one side reduces the difficulties of
monitoring for the other side.
Because the purpose of this paper is to discuss the technical as-
pects of some of the means of verification and not its broader political
context, we will not discuss such topics as the historical, political and
legal aspects of verification; the criteria of the quality of verifica-
tion (&dquo;adequate versus effective&dquo;); the question of the vulnerability to
&dquo;break-outs&dquo; to arms control treaties; the international means of veri-
fication as by the International Atomic Energy Agency or the proposed
International Satellite Monitoring Agency; the specific terms of arms
control treaties; charges and countercharges over violations of arms con-
trol treaties; and so forth.
III. PHOTOGRAPHIC RESOLUTION
We can base part of our judgment on the quality of reconnaissance
photographs by considering the maiden flight of the Space Shuttle Columbia
on April 12, 1981. After the launch, the crew observed that several ther-
mal tiles were missing from the upper portion of the Columbia. There was
a great deal of concern that many other tiles might have been lost during
the launching of the Columbia, and that the lives of the crew might be
endangered during the re-entry into the earth’s atmosphere without the
protective covering of the heat shield. Unfortunately, it was not pos-
sible to determine directly if this fear was correct since the Columbia’s
TV monitors could not observe the bottom side of the craft. The question
was answered quickly by the Department of Defense (4) which used some
specialized photographic techniques with land-based cameras and with the
KH-11 reconnaissance satellite in orbit. The DoD determined that no tiles
were missing from the underside of the Columbia, and that the crew had
nothing to fear from this potential problem. From this measurement with
land-based cameras, we conclude that the resolution at height of 100 miles
must have been about 10-15 cm.
This same resolution can be achieved with orbiting cameras. Since
the object distance (o = 120 km) is much larger than the focal length
(f = 6 m), the image distance is the same as the focal length (i = f).
Using film with 100 lines/mm (ri = 10p), the object resolution would be
ro 
= 
ri (o/i) = (10 5m)(1.2 x 105 m/6 m) = 20 cm. (1)
If the diameter (D) of the lens was 1 m, the angular spread from the dif-
fraction limit of the lens can be ignored since
e(diff) = 1.2x/D = (1.2)(0.5 x 10 6 m)(1 m) = 0.6 prad, (2)
which is much less than the angular uncertainty induced by the film with
100 lines/mm,
e(film) = ri/i = (10 m)/(6 m) = 1.7 prad. (3)
If the film quality were to be improved to 1000 lines/mm (ri = 1 ~), the
theoretical resolution obtained through Eq. 1 would not apply since the
value of e(diff) = 0.6 prad would exceed the film resolution, e(film) =
0.17 prad. Thus, we conclude that the real resolution might be somewhat
between these two limits, or about 10 cm. Larger diameter mirrors, such
as the space telescope’s 2.4 m, have attained a resolution of 0.3 prad
(full-width at half-maximum in the laboratory), but this level of reso-
lution often isn’t necessary. A resolution of 10 cm is not sufficient to
read the masthead of a newspaper (as some have claimed), but it would
distinguish a Vokswagen Bug from a Chevrolet Vega (on a clear day).
Turbulence of the air imposes another limit on the resolution obtain-
able with these types of cameras. Such turbulence blurs, for example,
the images of stars for telescopes that look upwards through the atmos-
phere. Over times of the order of tens of milliseconds, the density of
air in cells about 20 cm in size fluctuates and thus misdirects the rays
of light from a star by angles of the order of a second of arc, or 5 prad.
This would smear a photograph looking upwards at the shuttle by about
50 cm, which is much more than the size of an individual tile. This ef-
fect is much greater for telescopes on the ground pointing away from the
earth than for reconnaissance cameras looking downwards towards the earth
because the turbulence is much closer to the land-based telescope than
it is to the satellites which are typically 150 km about the earth. An
effective way to remove this smearing for land-based telescopes is to use
the technique of &dquo;adaptive optics&dquo; which we will discuss below. Since
adaptive optics and smooth tracking can effectively reduce the spacial
resolution (looking upwards) at the altitude of the shuttle to, perhaps,
10 cm, itmight be expected that reconnaissance satellites (looking down-
wards with a 1 m lens) could also obtain resolutions of the order of 10
cm, since the problem of atmospheric turbulence is considerably reduced
looking downwards.
IV. VARIOUS IMPROVEMENTS IN OPTICS
The optical systems (5) for reconnaissance have improved considerably
over the past decade in a variety of ways:
1. Commerical aerial survey films are now available with a high
contrast capability of about 1000 line pairs per millimeter, or about one
micron between lines (or better).
2. The design of very good lens systems are complicated because
the various colors do not focus uniformly onto the plane of the film.
Since digital computers can rapidly trace hundreds of optical rays, com-
plex lens systems can be designed to minimize this problem.
3. Nonspherical lens can be machined with the aid of computers to
take into account deviations in the physical and geometrical properties
of the glass.
4. Stresses from temperature and pressure gradients can distort
a lens system. By using improved lens mounting materials and improved
thermal insulation materials, such as a blanket of 100 layers of metal
coated mylar, these problems have been minimized.
5. The forward motion of a satellite will slightly blur a photo-
graph. This smearing is removed by slightly moving the film relative to
the lens with precise timing mechanisms and servo control systems.
6. Similar objects can reflect and emit differently in the visible
and infrared wavelength regions. Multispectral cameras are used to re-
cord these differences in the colors by using a series of nearly identi-
cal lenses in combination with narrow-pass filters. Nine or more separate
photographs are taken to record the different wavelength images,orspec-
ial-layered multispectral films are used for one composite picture.
7. By using two views of the same terrain taken at different angles,
one can obtain stereoscopic images which resolve the heights of objects.
Such a cartographic camera in the Space Shuttle covered an area of 25,000
square kilometers in stereo with a resolution of about 10 meters with only
a single pair of pictures.
8. Fourier transform infrared spectrum has enhanced resolution
in the infrared by several orders of magnitude. Other advances which
are enclosed, and described below, are:
9. Adaptive optics.
10. Digital image processing.
11. Charge-coupled devices.
Adaptive Optics
Adaptive optics (6) is the ingenious technology that was first used
in astronomy to reduce the blurring of stars by atmospheric turbulence,
or to correct for imperfections in the optics of the telescope. By using
adaptive optics, it has been possible to improve the resolution of land-
based telescopes to nearly the diffraction limit. The main use of adap-
tive optics for verification so far has been to obtain high-resolution
images of satellites from land-based telescopes. Adaptive optics is not
as important for images obtained by satellite cameras because the &dquo;seeing&dquo;
problem caused by atmospheric turbulence is considerably smaller for the
case of satellites looking downwards through the atmosphere.
Adaptive optics systems use deformable mirrors, wavefront sensors,
and wavefront processors. Part of the light from the object being ob-
served is diverted into the wavefront processor which uses an array of
detectors to measure the intensity at different locations of the wave-
front. The light is chopped at the same instant in order to obtain the
time displacement and the spatial slope of the wavefront. This infor-
mation is processed in the wavefront processor which then directs the
electro-mechanical actuators to move the segments of the deformable mir-
ror in order to remove the phase shifts introduced into sections of the
wavefront by turbulence. It is necessary to be able to compensate for
the rapidly changing turbulence by moving the deformable mirrors by about
the wavelength of light (0.5 p). This must be done to within a small
fraction of a wavelength of light (about 1% of 0.5 u, or 10 nm) in order
to obtain good imaging. After this processing, the output image is re-
constructed in such a way as to remove the effects of the atmospheric
turbulence.
Digital Image Processing
The computer revolution has spawned great improvements in the abil-
ity to enhance (7) photographic images. The first textbooks on digital
image processing (DIP) were written in the late 1960s; now there are more
than a dozen textbooks, and universities have developed considerable
curricula to teach the art of DIP. The information content of a photo-
graph can be digitized by measuring the film density (or grey level) in
very small regions called pixels. However, the use of film can be avoided
altogether if electro-optical devices, such as charge-coupled devices,
are used to directly measure the optical intensity at each pixel location
and directly transfer the data into the memory of a computer. In either
case, by devising computational alogrithms as well as specialized hard-
ware systems consisting of 10,000 or more processing elements,it is pos-
sible to perform a variety of manipulations which enhance the digitized
image.
Images contain straight lines and edges that are blurred into a gray
transition region, going from light to dark. This blurring can be caused
by the optical system, by turbulence in the air, and by motion. DIP meth-
ods can restore lines and edges by searching for the shortest distance
through the gray transition region in the same way that a mountain clim-
ber might search out the steepest and shortest path down a mountain. Once
the computer has found the line or edge, it can restore the image by
shifting some of the data from the light &dquo;foothills&dquo; and returning it to
the dark &dquo;mountain tops.&dquo; II Other techniques can be used to remove the
noise from over-exposed photos, to enhance contrasts, or to search even
for various patterns such as circular missile silos. The advent of very
large scale integrated circuits (VLSIC) is increasing our capabilities
to do some of this processing directly in the satellites before trans-
mitting the image information to the earth. By comparing two images of
the same object that were taken at different times,one can look for small
changes in the environment that might have military significance.
The blurring of an image can be described mathematically by a point
spread-function (hc). By estimating this function it is possible to re-
move some of the effects of blurring and enhance the image. The basic
equation for the formation of an image is
0000
g(x,y)= ff hc (xl-x,yl-y) s(xl,yl) dx, dy, + n(x,y) (4)
where s is the direct and indirect flux at the sensor, and n is the noise.
One way to determine the point-spread is to Fourier transform the image
to obtain the image as a two-dimensional frequency distribution. By ig-
noring the noise term in Eq. 4, one obtains
G(u,v) = H(u,v) S(u,v) (5)
where u and v are the spatial 1 frequencies,and G,H, and S are the Fourier
transforms of g, h, and s.
Charge-Coupled Devices (CCD)
The use of film in a real-time mode in reconnaissance satellites
causes some difficulties; the film must be read either by a television
camera or a fiber optics reader; both of these methods blur the reso-
lution of very good film. In order to retain the good resolution of
high quality films, the film can be sent to the earth in a film canister
for analysis. However, this process is time consuming and can only be
done occasionally since the film supply is limited. In addition, film,
in spite of its excellent resolution, has other drawbacks; it is &dquo;non-
linear&dquo; in the sense that the darkness of the image on the negative sat-
urates ; if the exposure time is doubled, one gets less than twice the
darkening effect. Also, film has a very low quantum efficiency (the con-
version of light into developed silver grains), and it has a relatively
narrow dynamic range (white to black ratio). On the other hand, the
size of a pixel in a charge-coupled device (CCD) (8) is about a factor of
10 larger than the grain size of film that we quoted above (13 p for
the CCD vs. about 1 u for film). In addition, the conversion for reso-
lution from pixels and grain size adds another factor of 2 to 3; the CCDs
might, therefore, only have a resolution from low earth orbit of about
50 cm with a 6 m focal length. However, by using longer focal length
lens systems with CCD sensors, it would be possible to obtain the same
ground resolution as film. Because of the greater data handling capacity
of CCD sensors, as compared to film canisters retrieved from satellites,
CCDs will become very important in the field of reconnaissance verifi-
cation. In the near term, CCDs will be used with long focal length sys-
tems or by sacrificing resolution, or a combination of both; in the long
term, CCDs will be improved by shrinking the pixel size and by using CCDs
directly with computer processing devices.
The development of CCDs has solved most of the problems of films,
plus several more. The CCDs are read directly by computers; this real-
time use negates the tortuous and limiting process of ejecting film can-
isters from satellites and laboriously converting the images to digital
data. In addition, the CCDs are about 50 times more efficient than film;
they are linear in that the stored charge is proportional to the time of
the exposure; they are sensitive to a broader range of colors and infra-
red ; and they have a much greater dynamic range between white and black.
As a further bonus, the CCDs are very reliable, have a very small mass
compared to a year’s supply of film, and they don’t need a high voltage
supply that TV requires. The CCDs presently being installed on the space
telescope consist of an array of 2.5 million pixels (1600 x 1600).
Infrared
Reconnaissance photos can also be taken during the day or the night
with infrared detectors which are sensitive to heat. Arrays of infrared
sensors (9) like CCDs, are available and are used in space astronomy and
on guidance systems for some battlefield weapons. These infrared detec-
tors provide data which can be used to determine the nature of the heat
source. For example, thermal mappings of the atmosphere are taken by IR
sensors on weather satellites, and the speed and altitude of aircraft may
be determined by more sensitive IR sensors. Infrared detection technol-
ogy currently lags behind radar and optical sensors in scale and scope of
usage, but applications are constantly growing. One major advantage ofinfrared and optical sensors over radar systems is that they do not broad-
cast radiation; thus, they do not give away their presence or location
as do &dquo;active sensors.&dquo; This &dquo;passive&dquo; quality is of great value in many
surveillance and reconnaissance applications.
There are two &dquo;windows&dquo; II in the atmosphere which will transmit ir,
between 3-5 p and 8-14 p. The best possible resolution in the 10 p region
(with folded optical systems) will be about an order of magnitude worse(about 20 trad) th n for the visible region since the ir wavelength is
20 times the wavelength in the visible region. This result is consistent
with the resolutions obtained in recent astronomical ir measurements:
The IRAS satellite has obtained dramatic photographs of astronomical
bodies in the infrared, as well as locating a ring of solid material at
an angle of50~rad from the star Vega, Mt. Polomar has obtained 4 prad
in the ir, and the 4 m Kitt Peak telescope observed a &dquo;planet&dquo; 5 prad
from the star VB-8. A resolution of
e(diff) = 1.2x/D = (1.2)(14 p)/(l m) = 20 prad (6)
from low earth orbit would give a ground resolution of about 2-3 m. The
ir devices measure the accumulated charge at a pixel due to the thermal
intensity. The best available temperature sensitivity is about 0.01 K
from a body at 300 K, which requires a voltage measurement accurate to
A(aT4 )/(aT4 ) = (4)(AT/T) = (4)(0.01/300) = 0.01%. (7)
The achievable accuracy from a satellite will be diminished by the atmos-
phere and it will depend on the sweep speed of the device as well as
other parameters.
There are still many significant technological issues to be solved
before satellites can exploit the full potential of infrared for treaty
verification. Current ir systems use smaller arrays of about 20,000
detectors as compared to optical CCDs with arrays of 3 million detectors
or phased-array radars with 35,000 radiating elements. The Landsat,
Tiros, and Nimbus series of ir remote sensors provide dramatic examples
of the uses of ir sensing to acquire data on crops, to locate petroleum
and minerals, and to observe the weather.
V. RADAR
Synthetic aperture radar (SAR) systems (10) mounted in satellites
are presently used to obtain maps of features on the earth and the plan-
ets as well as to monitor military activities. Resolution from SAR is
not as good as the resolution obtained with optical systems, but it can
be used during the night and when the objects are covered with clouds,
rain or foliage. To obtain high resolution radar images of the earth
from a satellite witha &dquo;single exposure&dquo; would require an antenna several
kilometers long. To circumvent this problem, the motion of the satellite
is used to increase the effective size of the antenna. The SAR systems
are used by both satellites and reconnaissance airplanes. The SEASAT
satellite at an orbit height of 800 km has a resolution of about 20 m.
The resolution could be improved to about 8 meters by using a higher
carrier frequency. Considerably better resolutions of 1 to 3 meters are
possible if the higher frequency of 10 GHz were used at lower altitudes.
For example, consider the case of a radar operating at 6 GHz (X=0.05 m)
at a slant range of R = 200 km. To obtain a resolution (AR) or 5 m, the
angular resolution would have to be
e= AR/R = 25 prad = X/2D. (8)
(The synthesized antenna produces an effective beam width from an antenna
which is twice the synthetic antenna length.) This gives a synthetic
aperture with a diameter of 1 km. Since the orbital velocity for a low
earth orbit is about 8 km/s, the processing time for the SAR would have
to be about 0.1 second. Longer processing times would improve resolution
in the tracking direction, parallel to the velocity of the satellite, but
it can never be better than 1/2 of the length of the actual antenna. As
in the case of optical systems, the best achievable resolutions would be
limited by atmospheric inhomogeneities and radar stability. Three-dimen-
sional surface maps can be obtained by either placing two antennas on a
satellite or airplane,or by recording images during two successive passes
over the region and correlating these images.
Ground-based radars can be used to monitor re-entry vehicles and
satellites. An inverse synthetic aperture radar (ISAR) is effectively
created as the re-entry vehicle approaches the radar. As the RV rotates,
it is possible to determine some aspects of its shape by using the motion
of the RV to increase the effective size of the antenna as in the case
of SAR. These techniques can be used to determine sizes to determine if
&dquo;new classes&dquo; of missiles are being tested.
The SALT II treaty places a limit on the number of RVs that are
tested on each type of missile. Such testing can be monitored by large
phased array radars (PAR), like the Cobra Dane radar that use an array
of 34,769 small radiating and detecting elements to track simultaneously
up to 100 objects, the size of a grapefruit, at a distance of the order
of 2000 km. By varying the phases between the individual radiators and
detectors, the radar beam can be steered onto the target. Digital pro-
cessing techniques similar to those used for photographs are used to en-
hance the resolution. The PAR Cobra Judy radar is mounted on the stern
of the USNS Observation Island. It can move around on the ocean and mon-
itor various properties of re-entry vehicles such as their mass and mis-
sile coefficient (a measure of its accuracy), as well as count the number
of re-entry vehicles released by a single missile. PAR radars also can
be used for early warning and space tracking, as well as for battle man-
agement of anti-satellite and ballistic missile defense systems.
VI. NUCLEAR WEAPONS TESTS
The Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) of 1963 was the first major arms
control treaty signed by the U.S., U.K. and the U.S.S.R. Since the LTBT
forbids nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, in the sea, or in space
it forces nuclear weapons tests to be held underground. It is an inter-
esting fact of history that the U.S. Senate decisively ratified (88 to
19) the LTBT before launching the first VELA satellites which were needed
to verify compliance with the treaty provisions against explosions above
the atmosphere. (Seismographs and other equipment could verify explos-
ions in and below the atmosphere.) For the verification of a Complete
Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) a network of about 24 seismic stations located in-
side (and near) the U.S.S.R. could be used to identify nuclear weapons
tests in a decoupling cavity having yields as low as 1 to 5 kilotons
with 90% confidence. Improvements in seismic technology hold out the
promise that test ban treaties will be more verifiable in thd future than
in the past.
Since the ratification of the Limited Test Ban Treaty in 1963, there
has indeed been considerable progress on technical means of monitoring
weapons tests:
1. Seismic signals at frequencies of about 30 Hertz can consider-
ably improve the ability to detect and identify explosions that might be
hidden by detonating in large cavities (decoupling);
2. Seismic stations appropriate for unattended use in remote places
of foreign countries have been tested and are in use; and
3. Vela satellites are being joined by 18 Navstar Global Position-
ing Satellites (GPS), which will make nuclear testing in and above the
atmosphere more readily identifiable.
High Frequency Discrimination
Estimates of the desirability of nuclear test ban treaties have been
greatly influenced by the fear of undetectable underground cheating. By
exploding a nuclear weapon in a large cavity in the earth, the explosion
can be partially decoupled from the earth, reducing the amplitudes of the
wave by a factor as large as about 200 at lower frequencies (perhaps by
60-75 in practice). The frequency spectra of both nuclear explosions and
earthquakes are relatively flat, or unchanging, up to their &dquo;corner fre-
quency&dquo; beyond which the amplitude decreases with increasing frequency.
This can be seen by considering the frequency spectrum U(w) which was ob-
tained (11) by Fourier transforming the elastic deplacement produced by
a step pressure P at a distance r:
U(w) = (a3Pov)/(cr)(v2 - 0.075a2w2 + ivaw) (9)
where the compressional velocity v = 4 km/s, the elastic pressure limit
of the media is Po (440 bars for salt), a is the size of the cavity for
elastic behavior, and c is a constant. The low frequency limit (w« v/a)
does not depend on w while the high frequency limit is proportional to
w-2. The corner frequency of an explosion occurs at higher frequencies
than that of an earthquake of equivalent low frequency p-wave amplitudes
because the explosion takes place more quickly and in a smaller volume.
The decoupling of an explosion in a cavity shifts the &dquo;corner frequency&dquo;
(Figure 1) to higher frequencies, resulting in greatly reduced decoupling
at the higher frequencies. Thus, a decoupled explosion might have its
amplitude reduced by about a factor of up to 200 at low frequencies be-
low the corner frequency, but by only a factor of about 8 above the cor-
ner frequency. Figure 1 shows that the amplitude of earthquakes falls
off more rapidly with frequency that is the case for explosions, so that
at higher frequencies, in the region above 30 Hertz, the earthquake amp-
litudes are less important. These data show that the reductions of the
amplitudes of the decoupled explosions are relatively less at the higher
frequencies. The high frequency components can be used to detect and
identify decoupled explosions down to about less than 1 kiloton (11), or
3-10 kilotons (12) without the high frequencies with about 90% confidence.
Unattended In-Country Seismic Stations
In order to provide the required capabilities to verify a CTBT, each
side must be able to observe seismic signals on the soil 1 of the other
country. The Pugwash Conference in 1962, proposed building automatic
seismic stations that were &dquo;sealed in such a way that they cannot be tam-
pered with.&dquo; Starting in the mid-1960s, the Sandia National Laboratories
(13) has built and tested unattended stations, and now uses them in a
network in the U.S. and Canada, as well as at the small-aperature NORSAR
array in Norway. ThE- unattended stations are powered by thermoelectric
generators, with batteries as back-up power in case of a failure in the
generator system. The seismic data is sent by satellite link unencrypted
to whatever collection points are desired, so that the data can be avail-
able to all those who wish to receive it. Procedures and equipment have
Figure 1
Decoupled Nuclear Explosions. The frequency spectrum of an
underground nuclear explosion is &dquo;flat&dquo; or unchanging up to
its &dquo;corner frequency&dquo; where the amplitude drops at higher
frequencies. If the explosion takes place in a large cavity
in the earth, the amplitudes of the lower frequencies can
drop by as much as a factor of 50 to 200. However, the de-
coupled explosion’s high frequency spectrum does not change
as dramatically. The corner frequency is shifted to higher
frequencies so that the amplitudes are decreased by only a
factor of about eight. The higher frequency region above
30 Hertz is a promising region for these kinds of measure-
ments because the amplitudes from earthquakes and the micro-
seismic noise are reduced at higher frequencies.
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been incorporated directly into the system design of the seismic stations
to prevent the undetected introduction of false information into the data
stream.
Nuclear Explosions in the Atmosphere and Space
The capability to observe nuclear explosions in and above the atmos-
phere are excellent. This has been done by the Vela satellites which
have been improved considerably over the years. Initially the Velas were
estimated to have a lifetime of only 9 months, but they have typically
lasted more than 13 years. The Velas were launched in pairs and placed
Figure 2
An optical 1 bhangmeter records the signal 1 from a 19 kiloton
atmospheric nuclear test. The shape of the double phase is
used to determine the yield of the explosion.
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180° apart in 115,000 km radius orbits, providing constant observation
at all times of almost the entire earth. Above the ground explosions
generate large amounts of x-rays, gamma-rays and neutrons, which, when
released in the atmosphere, cause large optical and electromagnetic sig-
nals. The Vela satellites detect both the primary and secondary signals.
The Panofsky Panel in 1959 pointed out the difficulty of concealing these
effects. For example, a one-megaton explosion above the atmosphere will
deposit more than a billion 10-keV x-rays in a one square cm detector
located in a Navstar satellite 25,000 km from the explosion. Thus, ex-
plosions of less than a kiloton are readily observable even when exploded
beyond the geosynchronous orbits of the earth. Smaller, but still readily
observable, fluxes of gamma rays and neutrons are also produced.
After the last Vela launch in 1970,the Air Force placed large multi-
purpose satellites in geosynchronous orbit, and, in 1983 a new series of
satellites, the NAVSTAR Global Positioning Satellites (GPS), were init-
ially deployed. The GPS satellites will have a dual purpose because they
will monitor possible nuclear explosions as well as to be used for navi-
gation and guidance of missiles. In all, there will be 18 satellites
located at an orbital 1 radius of 26,000 km in nongeosynchronous orbits;
any spot on earth can be observed at all times by 4 to 8 of the GPS sat-
ellites. The accurate clock system of the GPS satellites will allow the
determination of the position of a nuclear explosion with great accuracy.
Had these instruments been functioning in 1979, they would, most likely,
have removed the ambiguity from the Vela data of the &dquo;event&dquo; over the
South Atlantic. (In 1980, the Ruina Panel of the Presidential Office of
Science and Technology Policy reported that the light signals recorded
by a Vela satellite over the South Atlantic were probably not from a nuc-
lear explosion.)
A nuclear explosion in the atmosphere gives a unique double-peaked
optical pulse. The initial burst of x-rays lasts less than 1 ps; these
x-rays are absorbed in the first few meters of air, and their energy then&dquo;diffuses&dquo; to create a fireball by heating the air to about 10 K. Short-
ly afterwards, a shockwave carries the energy beyond the fireball. Since
this high-temperature shocked gas is ionized, it is opaque to the optical
radiation from the fireball behind it, thus reducing the luminosity of
the fireball. After the shocked gas has expanded and cooled, it again
becomes transparent to light, and the intensity of the fireball again
rises. This very distinctive light curve is measured with a photometer
known as a &dquo;bhangmeter&dquo; which measures the light intensity as a function
of time. The time between the pulses can be used to determine the magni-
tude of the explosion (a value of 19 kilotons can be derived for the ex-
plosion shown in Figure 2). Since the earth is a very bright object, it
is necessary to use the fast rise time of the optical signal (of the or-
der of milliseconds) to distinguish the characteristic double optical
pulse from the background light signals. Nuclear weapon explosions also
develop a very large voltage pulse called an electromagnetic pulse, or
EMP. An explosion can be identified even more credibly by observing the
timing between the EMP pulse with respect to the optical bhangmeter sig-
nal.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
We have described some of the impressive newer technologies that are
being used to monitor the military technologies and weapons systems for
the verification of arms control treaties. Once the data have been ob-
tained from these instruments, analysts and politicians will make the
decisions as to whether or not there has been compliance with the pro-
visions of arms control treaties. It is true that advances in science
and technology have often exacerbated the relations between nations and
accelerated the arms race; it is encouraging to see that technological
advances can also help stabilize the arms race. Since it appears that
the quality of the verification technologies is one of the main limiting
conditions on expanding the reach of arms control treaties, these tech-
nical advances could be helpful in breaking the political impass on po-
tential future arms control treaties.
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